PHIL 295 - Seminar on Philosophical Topics

FDR: HU, GE4c
Credits: 3
When Offered: Fall, Winter

Topic for Winter, 2010:

PHIL 295: Metaethics (3). Recommended for students who have already taken at least one course in philosophy. Do moral judgments express truths that are independent of our feelings and conventions? Are “goodness” and “wrongness” real properties of things, or do we simply use these terms to express our subjective preferences toward states of affairs? Can we reason about morality? Do moral considerations provide practical reasons for all rational agents, or does the normative force of these considerations depend upon an agent¹s subjective desires? We read articles and parts of books, mainly by contemporary philosophers, in which these questions are analyzed and systematic arguments are offered for particular answers to them. (HU, GE4c) Smith.

Topics for Fall, 2009:

PHIL 295A: John Stuart Mill (3). A study of the life and ideas of a 19th-century philosopher ahead of his time. The class consider such questions as : Are liberty and individuality absolutely crucial to human happiness? Are we morally obligated to conduct our lives in ways that maximize the greatest aggregate happiness? Should women and men have equal rights and opportunities? How can we combine the benefits of capitalism (higher productivity and innovation) with the benefits of socialism (avoiding poverty and exploitation)? Is it more important to fill your head with knowledge or your heart with love? (HU, GE4c) Bell

PHIL 295B: Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (3). Prerequisite: Two courses in philosophy. Intended for philosophy majors and minors. An introduction to central issues concerning the concept of moral responsibility. This course considers the question of whether humans (or other beings) are morally responsible for their activities, along with an examination of disagreements about the nature of moral responsibility and the conditions of its application. Questions addressed include: What conditions must be met for someone to be a morally responsible agent? for moral responsibility for a particular thing? for someone to be blameworthy or praiseworthy for that thing? Are people responsible only for voluntary actions, or also for (possibly non-voluntary) omissions, attitudes, and character? What role, if any, should facts about a person’s upbringing or culture play in our attributions of responsibility and/or ascriptions of praise or blame? After a brief introduction to the “traditional” problem of free will and moral responsibility, we consider a number of contemporary philosophical perspectives on such questions, including seminal work by P. F. Strawson, John Martin Fischer, Harry Frankfurt, T. M. Scanlon, Gary Watson, and Susan Wolf, among others. (HU, GE4c) Smith